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Drug Testing in Public High Schools:
Singling Out Student Athletes
I. INTRODUCTION

Several recent cases challenging drug testing programs in public high schools
indicate that student-athletes have often been singled out for testing, leaving
other students unaffected by such policies. This article will examine how the
court system has essentially encouraged such line-drawing and why it generally
believes that drug testing practices aimed at student-athletes are more consistent
with the Fourth Amendment than those directed at other members of the student
population. However, although courts tend to favor this "singling out" process,
not every drug testing program targeted at those on school sports teams will pass
constitutional muster. Because the Fourth Amendment does not pertain to the
actions of private schools,' they will not be included in this discussion.
II. COURT ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE 'SINGLING OUT' PROCESS

Drug testing in public high schools is a rather recent phenomenon and thus,
few cases have been adjudicated on this subject. Yet, in cases that have arisen
concerning such testing practices, courts have impressed the notion that public
school officials should narrowly tailor their testing programs.
In Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Ind. School Dist.,2 a case involving a
drug testing program directed at all students who wished to participate in schoolsponsored extra-curricular activities, the court made some telling comments
regarding those testing programs that sweep too broadly. It stated, "Every court
that has considered urine testing of the general student body in a public school
has found it unconstitutional." 3 With regard to the case at hand, the court said
that the testing program was the most intrusive of any school district in the state
because it tested the "widest range" of students.4 Those participating in extracurricular activities comprised over half the student body.'
The legal rationale relied 6pon by the Brooks court in striking down the
expansive testing program stemmed from the case of Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East
Rutherford School Dist.6 In Odenheim, a program which required every student

1. Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Ind. School Dist., 730 F.Supp. 763 (S.D. Tex. 1989). If a
search is being conducted by a private entity and not under the color of state law, then it is not subject to the same level of scrutiny that a search by a public official would receive. The United States
Supreme Court has held expressly that the Fourth Amendment applies to officials of public schools.
2. Id. at 765.

3. d.
4. d.
5. Id.
6. 510 A.2d 709 (N.J. Super. 1985).
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in the school to submit annual urine samples for drug testing was invalidated."
The Odenheim court first described students as possessing reasonable expectations of privacy.8 It then stated that regardless of what the true motives were for
the program, the invasion on the privacy interests of the student population was
not justified, largely because school policy already provided for exclusion and/or
suspension of students who were found to be involved with drug activity.9 As
Odenheim illustrates, courts tend to favor a method for dealing with drug abuse
by students which does not involve an intrusion into a student's person.
Brooks is consistent with the above view in that the Brooks court found the
Indiana drug testing program to be an inadequate means for deterring students
from using drugs, partly because students could find out in advance when they
would be tested.' 0 To obtain a clean result, students might decide to simply
refrain from using drugs during the period immediately preceding the test. Thus,
the ineffective testing procedure unnecessarily invaded the reasonable privacy
interest of students in the school when drug abuse could perhaps be successfully
limited by a different system, such as peer counseling programs for students who
clearly have a substance abuse problem, or a system encouraging anonymous
reporting of drug users by fellow students.'
Therefore, Brooks and Odenheim present instances where the means do not
justify the ends. While school officials' interest in curbing drug abuse by all
students in their institutions is a legitimate one, the court holdings reveal that
when the goals sought by drug testing could be met by other means not
involving the intrusion into bodily privacy, the testing program will likely be
struck down. Although the other methods used could arguably infringe on
privacy interests as well, urine testing, examined below, receives more suspicion
from the courts because it qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search.' 2 However,
one will later note that when this search is applied solely to student-athletes, a
lower level of scrutiny may be warranted, since this group's privacy interest is
3
already somewhat weaker than that of other students.'
As in the previous two cases, the court in Schaill v. Tippecanoe County
School Corp.4 flatly refused to endorse drug testing of broad groups of
students. In addition, Schaill did something which the Brooks and Odenheim
courts did not do: the Schaill court clearly advocated the separation of studentathletes and other students into two distinct groups. 5 As the court upheld a
random drug testing program applicable only to students seeking to participate on
the school's sports teams, it emphasized the relevance of the narrow scope to its

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id. at 713.
Id.
Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 762.
Id.
Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1318.
864 F.2d 1309.
Id. at 1318.
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ruling. It stated, "sports are quite distinguishable from almost any other activity.
Random testing of athletes does
not necessarily imply random testing of band
'6
members or the chess team.'
The Schaill court's attitude stemmed from the same point recognized in
Brooks and Odenheim: students generally have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. However, while the Brooks and Odenheim courts assumed that all
schoolchildren had reasonable expectations of privacy that were not to be
infringed upon by a broad-based urinalysis program when other alternatives
could be invoked, Schaill presents another perspective. Under the Schaill view,
student-athletes are excluded from the reasonable privacy interests category, in
which all other students fall. Indeed, as the court plainly stated in a footnote,
"the considerations discussed in the text also
serve to distinguish athletes from
7
members of the general school population."'
The "considerations" justifying the disparity in the privacy interests between
the two groups will be addressed in the Fourth Amendment analysis section
below.
As mentioned above, the Brooks court seemed to view all students as having
reasonable expectations of privacy. Because this decision followed Schaill, the
court sought to reconcile its views with those presented in that case. For that
reason, it was stated in Brooks that the "law of the Seventh Circuit is different
from and less protective of student rights than Fifth Circuit laws.""8 Despite this
comment, the argument can be made that the Brooks court was not entirely
opposed to the Schaill position that athletics are inherently different from other
extra-curricular, or academic activities. This is indicated by its statement that the
Schaill19testing program was "considerably more limited than the one before this
court."

While "limited" could be read to refer solely to the fact that only thirty
percent of students were to be tested under the Schaill program,2" as opposed to
over fifty percent pursuant to the Brooks program, 2' the use of the term might
instead represent the view that student-athletes are a distinct group, even when a
significant percentage of the school population composes this group. The
inference can be made that the word "limited" is directly linked to the status of
student-athletes themselves, because in terms of implications for student-athletes,
the Schaill and Brooks testing programs are very similar. Under both programs,
students testing positive for drug use would simply have to forego some
participation in school-sponsored extracurricular activities.' No suspension or
expulsion from school would result from a positive testing result. Thus, had the
punishment on the student been the focus of the Brooks court, the Schaill

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at1319.
Id.at fn. 10.
Brooks, supra note 1, at 766.
Id.
See Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F.Supp. 833, 835 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
Brooks, supra note 1, at 765.
Schaill, supra note 12, at 1319; Brooks, supra note 1, at 765.
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program could not have been considered more limited.
Before analyzing the singling out of student-athletes in the Fourth Amendment
context, the legitimacy of such a process under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution should be mentioned. A student-athlete is not considered to be a

member of a suspect class.' In addition, as education is not a fundamental
interest, the participation in a sports program stemming from an educational
institution is likewise not a fundamental interest.24 Hence, "under the Equal
Protection Clause, courts will uphold student-athlete drug testing that is rationally

related to a state institution's legitimate interest of ensuring the health and safety
of athletes and protecting the integrity of the sport."

Because of this weak

standard, a student-athlete testing program is not likely to violate the Equal
Protection Clause, as long as it is not an irrational means of achieving the
asserted goals.
ITI.

FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause .... " 26 Urinalysis, a common method of drug testing, has been deemed a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment because each person possesses a

reasonable expectation of privacy in his act of urination and in the product which
is excreted. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has recently ruled that the
probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not

applicable to school searches, 28 the next inquiry that must be made centers on

whether the search by public school officials is reasonable. 29 Determining
reasonableness involves a careful balancing of the invasion on the individual's
privacy interest by the search against the purpose of the state-run academic institution in conducting the search.30

23. Charles Feeney Knapp, Drug Testing and the Student-Athlete: Meeting the Constitutional
Challenge, 76 IowA L.REv. 107, 126 (1990).
24. Id. at 126.
25. Id.
26. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
27. Schaill, supra note 12 at 1318.
28. Id. at 1315 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)). A school official's primary mission is not to ferret out crime, but is instead to teach students in a safe and secure learning
environment. School officials should not be required to proceed through the courts each time they
desire to obtain further information regarding a possible violation of school rules.
29. Id. The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be
reasonable, and although the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the
reasonableness of a search. . . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required.
30. Acton v. Vemonia School Dist., 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (D. Or. 1992).
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A. Student Athlete Privacy Interests

An initial examination of the reasonableness of the courts' position must focus
on the intrusion on the student-athlete's privacy interest via drug testing. Then,
one must determine what sets student-athletes apart from the rest of the studentbody and why drug testing of the former group versus the latter is more likely to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
The Schaill court found that as compared to their fellow classmates, studentathletes have diminished expectations of privacy, and in particular, privacy with
respect to urinalysis. 3' One reason it stressed to support this view was the
element of 'communal undress' which is an integral part of athletic
participation.32 The logic seems to be that while many individuals are reticent
about removing their clothing while in the presence of others, athletes normally
are accustomed to changing their attire in open locker rooms, and thus they tend
not to possess the same degree of modesty in this respect. A broader notion is
also implicated. Since athletes may be comfortable with the notion of undressing
when others are present, perhaps they likewise, will not feel timid about
engaging in another usually private activity, urination, when school officials are
nearby.
Another reason for the Schaill court's determination that student-athletes do
not have the same expectations of privacy as other students with regard to urine
testing, was that physical examinations are a part of almost all athletic programs.
The student-athletes in this case were already required to produce a urine sample
as part of this medical examination. 33 While this sample tested solely for the
presence of sugar in the urine, the court stated that "the fact that such samples
are required suggests that legitimate expectations of privacy in this context are
diminished."' Despite the difference between the narrow goals of this type of
test versus a drug test, the important concept to note is that student-athletes,
unlike other individuals, may view the two tests in a similar manner. Because
many athletic activities place tremendous strain on the bodies of unfit or
unhealthy individuals, it is arguably very important that a person receive a clean
bill of health before he/she goes onto the playing field. Thus, all urine tests
which detect substances adversely affecting the body may seem acceptable in the
eyes of a student-athlete. While a student-athlete may not want to take any urine
test, he/she may not feel hostile about submitting a urine sample that in some
way will go towards protecting his/her well-being.
In upholding a student-athlete drug testing program, the court in Acton v.
Vernonia School Dist. reinforced Schaill. It stated, "[Riegulations already require
that students undergo a physical examination prior to participation, the locker
rooms themselves are open spaces and do not provide a great deal of privacy."35

31. Schaill, supra note 12, at 1318.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
supra note 30, at 1363. 2016
Published35.byVernonia,
Digital Commons@DePaul,
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While the Brooks court did not mention a diminished privacy expectation for
the student-athletes encompassed by the testing program at issue, Brooks can
perhaps be reconciled with Schaill and Vernonia by again noting that the
program also included students participating in non-sports related extracurricular
activities. The wide sweep of the program was a major flaw of the school
district's testing policy, and "by testing non-athletes, the school introduced
testing subjects whose expectations of privacy are not diminished by the
communal undress of locker rooms and the pre-existence of annual physicals and
urine sampling."36
Although the elements of communal undress and submission of a urine
sample as part of a mandatory medical examination lend support to the theory
that student-athletes have weakened expectations of privacy with respect to
urinalysis, other factors were also pertinent to the Schaill court's conclusion. For
example, in Indiana, students' participation in interscholastic athletics was
already subject to a great deal of regulation, such as minimum grades, residency
and eligibility requirements, and training rules, including prohibitions on
smoking, drinking, and drug use both on and off the school premises.37 Thus,
unlike other students, student-athletes were used to satisfying standards and
abiding by restrictions set by the school system. In other words, they had
essentially opened themselves up to a situation in which much of their behavior
will depend upon the direction of others. Accordingly, in the eyes of studentathletes already accustomed to following the orders of the school authorities, a
urinalysis program perhaps would not be viewed with much alarm.
The Schaill court also reasoned that student-athletes would not expect to
remain immune from drug testing procedures since from numerous press reports,
they already would know that many prominent collegiate and professional
athletes have been obligated to undergo urine testing for drug use.3 8 Likewise,
they would be aware that some of these athletes with positive testing results have
been suspended or disqualified for their sports. 39 Stated simply, student-athletes
choosing to join athletic teams will likely believe that drug testing in the form of
urinalysis simply comes with the territory.
B. Purpose of Testing Programs
Because student-athletes in public schools can arguably be said to have a
lesser privacy interest than their classmates, the Fourth Amendment balance will
tend to more easily tip in the school's favor when a drug testing program
targeting the student-athletes is at issue. However, the weakened privacy interest

36. Knapp, supra, note 23, at 131. While none of the opinions specifically state who is encompassed by the category of student-athlete, Schaill does make clear that cheerleaders may be tested in
the same fashion as student-athletes. This is evident from the fact that the drug testing program upheld in that case tested student-athletes and cheerleaders in an identical manner. Schaill, 864 F.2d at
1310.
37. Schaill, supra note 12, at 1318.
38. Id. at 1319.
39. Id. at 1319.
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possessed by those on school sports teams must still be overcome. Therefore,
one must focus on the other side of the scale, which concerns the purposes of the
public school officials for drug testing student-athletes. Because Vernonia and
Schaill are apparently the only decisions dealing specifically with student-athlete
drug testing programs in public high schools, two main purposes for drug testing
set forth in both of those cases deserve close attention. It should be noted that
while there is some case law concerning student-athlete drug testing in the
university setting,40 the goals to be achieved with urinalysis in that context will
likely be rather different from those adopted in high schools. The distinction
relates to the fact that college students have "for the most part reached
adulthood, university programs are far less structured... and discipline is
largely left to the students." 4
One purpose for testing only student-athletes relates to a special concern on
the part of school officials over the safety of this group. This concern was
heavily stressed in Vernonia.4 2 There, the court cited convincing testimony that
some football players under the influence of drugs ignored or forgot well-drilled
safety routines.43 The court also noted that a school wrestler had been severely
injured when he failed to execute a basic maneuver, with the accident evidently
somewhat attributable to marijuana use by him.44 Testimony given by a
physician corroborated the notion that drugs have deleterious effects on a
person's "motivation, memory, judgment, reaction, coordination, and
performance. ' 45 Thus, drug use may have a "numbing influence" on an
individual, which may be especially dangerous to the student-athlete given the
very competitive nature of many high school sports teams.46 The Vernonia
court found the drug testing program for student-athletes to be justified under the
Fourth Amendment, partially due the school's interest in discovering the identity
of the players using drugs as a means of averting further related accidents in
athletic events.47
Likewise, in Schaill, the school officials' desire to protect the safety of the
student-athletes contributed to the court's decision that the student-athlete testing
policy at issue was reasonable and hence, consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
As in Vernonia, it was generally noted in Schaill that use of drugs presented
special risks to student-athletes: "Due to alterations of mood, reduction of motor
coordination and changes in the perception of pain attributable to drug use, the
health and safety of athletes was particularly threatened."48 Direct evidence of
the dangers drugs posed to students on school sports teams was also provided.

40. See, e.g., Hill v. NCAA, 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1990).
41. Vernonia, supra note 30, at 1363.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1356.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
Schaill. supra
note 12, at 1320. 2016
Published 48.
by Digital
Commons@DePaul,
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For instance, in one situation, a baseball player, under the influence of drugs,
suffered a broken nose after he misjudged a pitch and turned his face toward the
ball.
The second purpose for testing only student-athletes for drug use pertains to
disciplinary and behavioral matters. Both Vernonia and Schaill pointed to the
fact that student-athletes are often very respected by their peers and may serve as
role models to other students.49 Due to their esteemed status, it is more likely
that other students will attempt to follow in their footsteps, even if doing so
involves misconduct.5" Thus, if the abuse of drugs by student-athletes can be
deterred by way of drug testing them, others students, desiring to emulate their
role models, may similarly refrain from using the prohibited substances. 5' Stated somewhat differently, where non-athletes cannot be tested, they may nonetheless be inspired to abstain from drugs if drug use is not considered "cool" by
those they admire. Both the Vernonia court and the Schaill court found this
purpose to be reasonable. However, this purpose was more significant in Vernonia, due to the isolated and rural nature of the community in which drug testing
was conducted.
Therefore, after comparing both sides of the balance in order to determine the
reasonableness of a student-athlete drug testing program under the Fourth
Amendment, it is evident that school officials can give courts persuasive reasons
for conducting such a program without too much difficulty. However, the
analysis cannot stop there. One must still take into account that such programs
are by no means per se constitutional.
C. Passing Muster Under the FourthAmendment
Simply because public school officials target student-athletes with drug testing
does not mean that courts will always approve of such programs. While it is true
that in the two cases dealing specifically with student-athlete drug testing in
public high schools the programs were approved, the courts in Vernonia and
Schaill were still very cognizant of the fact that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement is not easily satisfied. These courts made clear that having
a diminished privacy interest on one side of the scale, and persuasive purposes
for conducting the drug testing program, on the other, does not end the inquiry.
The "invasion" component of the balancing test still must be more fully
explored. In one respect, this term seems to operate hand-in-hand with the
lessened privacy expectations of the student-athlete. That is, if a student-athlete's
privacy expectations are diminished, there logically will be less of an invasion on
that right to privacy. Yet, for the invasion to be truly justified, it may still have
to be highly necessary and very limited in scope. In other words, there are
substantive and procedural considerations that are important for completing a
determination on the reasonableness of a student-athlete drug testing program.

49. Id. at 1321; Vernonia, supra note 30, at 1363.
50. Schaill, supra note 12, at 1320.
51. Vernonia, supra note 30, at 1363.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol4/iss1/10
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The substantive consideration

that must be focused on pertains to

"individualized suspicion." When public school officials have no individualized
suspicion that a particular student-athlete has ever used drugs, they must
demonstrate a compelling need for the testing program. 2 This rule reveals a

key point: Despite the fact that a student-athlete has a weakened expectation of
privacy, if there is no compelling interest to justify the invasion on his rights
when he, himself, is not suspected of taking drugs, a testing program applied to
him may not be constitutional.
When a compelling interest is required to justify a student-athlete drug testing
program, simply vocalizing a persuasive purpose for the search, will not
suffice. 3 Thus, this explains why in both Vernonia and Schaill, with respect to
the purpose of preserving the safety of the athletes, the courts looked to the
record for evidence linking dangers on the playing field to drug use. The position
taken by both courts seems to be that in order to justify the testing of those
student-athletes in whom there is no individualized suspicion, school officials
must at least demonstrate that drugs have been used by some (not particular)

student-athletes at their respective institution during an athletic practice or

contest. 4 In Schaill, both the assistant principal and the athletic director testi-

fied to three such instances noted,55 while in Vernonia, the wrestling coach pointed to the two incidents mentioned previously.5

The above view receives further support from other cases. In Brooks, there
was nothing in the record to support a connection between drug use, participation
in extra-curricular activities, including athletics, and injuries sought to be

avoided.57 Likewise, in Derdeyn v. University of Colorado,8 which involved a

collegiate drug testing program, the court made an analysis similar to that in
Vernonia and Schaill, concluding that "no evidence of actual drug problems or

drug related injuries among the University's athletes was found. Hence, the
defendants failed to advance a compelling need based on actual student drug
related problems." 59

52. Vernonia, supra note 30, at 1362. The compelling need notion for urine testing can be traced
to Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1417 (1989) (suspicionless search
does not violate the Constitution where state has a compelling interest in guarding against hazardous,
latent conditions which rarely lead to individualized suspicion). See also Knapp, supra note 23, at
132("it seems apparent that the health and safety of athletes, where drug use and abuse is intensified,
is no less important than railway safety").
53. Vernonia, supra note 30, at 1362.
54. The Vernonia court said that Schaill "teaches that a school's random urinalysis program for
interscholastic athletes which employs the least intrusive means possible to effectuate this goal may
withstand constitutional scrutiny if based upon specific evidence of drug related injuries." Specific instances of drug use by student-athletes were then cited in Vernonia as an analogy to Schaill. Vernonia, supra note 30, at 1362.
55. Schaill, supra note 12, at 1320.
56. Vernonia. supra note 30, at 1356.
57. Vernonia, supra note 30, at 1362 (citing Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 764-5).
58. Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, 832 P.2d 1031 (Colo. App. 1991).
59. Id. at 1034-5. See also, Vernonia, supra note 30, at 1362: "Brooks... and Derdeyn teach
that by
a school
may
not justify a random urinalysis
Published
Digital
Commons@DePaul,
2016 program upon amorphous statistics or generalized
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The compelling need test appears somewhat more difficult to satisfy with
regard to the second main purpose described previously, that of instilling
discipline and limiting behavioral problems in public schools. The link between
deterring student-athlete drug use through testing programs and limiting
misconduct on the part of other students seems rather attenuated. Yet, in
Vernonia, the court did note that there was evidence that student-athletes were
role models for the entire community. 60 The court emphasized that the town
was very small and rural, with limited entertainment opportunities. Thus, interscholastic athletics played "a dominant role in the community" and student
athletes were "well known and admired. ' 6' Again, Vernonia emphasizes that
factual support for an articulated purpose has a key role when there is no
individualized suspicion.
Although Schaill did not discuss the second purpose with reference to
evidence in the record, one could argue that the court did not view this purpose
to be as important as that of safety. While the Seventh Circuit decision quoted
the district judge's statement that "the student-athlete is generally viewed by the
broader community with admiration and respect," it ignored the district judge's
qualification that this notion would not, without more, legitimize a student-athlete
drug testing program.6' Stated differently, the compelling need for the testing
program in Schaill seems more rooted in the purpose of preserving the welfare
of student-athletes than in that of dealing effectively with school disciplinary and
behavioral matters.
Therefore, to justify an invasion of a student-athlete's privacy with a drug
testing program in the absence of individualized suspicion, a factually based,
compelling need must be shown. The relationship between the "invasion"
component of the balancing test and procedural considerations now remains to be
analyzed.
The Schaill court linked the "invasion" notion to its concern over discretion
when it stated, "the search program must incorporate adequate safeguards" so
that even the diminished student-athletes' privacy interests are "not subject to the
discretion of the official in the field."' By safeguards, the court essentially
meant that the program must be carefully planned and controlled, such that the
search would not be any more intrusive on the privacy rights of those tested than
was necessary. Among other factors, the court stressed that there were specific
provisions for the manner in which the urine sample would be obtained and for
the consequences of positive test results, along with a specification that studentathletes would be fully advised of the manner in which the program would
operate when they were initially asked to sign consent forms. 64

notions about the national drug problem."
60. Vernonia, supra note 30, at 1363. The court did not elaborate on the exact nature of the evidence as it made this conclusion.
61. Id. at 1356.
62. Schaill, supra note 20, at 856.
63. Schaill, supra note 12, at 1321.
64. Id.
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The collection of the urine sample in Schaill involved a school official
accompanying a student-athlete of the same sex to a bathroom. The student could
then enter a stall and close the door. The water in the toilet was tinted so that the
school official would know, without observing the student in the stall, that the
urine sample was authentic. 65 The school official then was to listen for normal
sounds of urination and to subsequently check the genuineness of the sample by
seeing if it was warm. Thus, this procedure helped to ensure that the tests were
not inaccurate due to tampering, yet the student-athlete's privacy was not
substantially undermined.66
Meanwhile, in Anable v. Ford,67 a case concerning a school drug testing program that was not targeted solely at student-athletes, the court found it
unreasonable to require "a teenaged student to disrobe from the waist down
while an adult school official, even though of the same sex, watches the student
urinate in the 'open' into a tube."' Although Brooks did not involve a school
official viewing the act of urination, the court still indicated that the method of
collecting the sample was very intrusive since the student tested had to hand his
urine sample to the school nurse in front of the school principal. 69
The two cases reflect an attitude by the courts that school officials' ability to
view a student's act of urination or the urine itself has more of an impact on
privacy than does their ability to hear the sounds of urination. This position is
logical due to the fact that when one urinates in any public restroom where there
are various stalls, there is no mechanism to prevent the sound of this process
from being heard by others who are also using the facility. The fact that a school
official hears the sounds of a student's urination does not seem any different
from this rather common occurrence. However, because bathroom stalls normally
have doors to inhibit others from witnessing one's act of urination, the ability of
a school official to see what others are not permitted to see clearly undermines
an individual's privacy. Hence, unlike Schaill, in these two cases, procedures
were not used to limit the degree of invasion on the student's privacy during the
collection process.
Schaill also placed great emphasis on the consequences for positive test
results with regard to the overall reasonableness of the program. The court stated
that "a student who has a positive urinalysis result will not even be denied
participation in the athletic program. He or she will merely be refused
participation in 30% of the games., 7' The court did not view this as an
excessive penalty. While in Vernonia, a student-athlete testing positive for drug
use might face suspension from the athletic program, he could avoid that result
by participating in an assistance program and taking a weekly drug test for six
weeks. 1 In contrast, Anable concerned a program where students might face
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1321.
Anable v. Ford, 653 F.Supp. 22, 41 (W.D. Ark. 1985), modified, 663 F.Supp. 149.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Schaill. supra note 12, at 1319.
Vernonia, supranote 30, at 1358. While sports had great prestige in the community discussed
Published by Digital
Commons@DePaul, 2016

11

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 10

DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW

[Vol. IV: 125

expulsion for positive test results.72 Therefore, the testing programs in Schaill
and Vernonia show a very limited burden placed on the rights of even those
student-athletes who test positive for drug use.
Last, the factor of consent should be focused on. Schaill points to a program
where student-athletes, prior to signing consent forms, were informed about what
the drug testing would entail, including the manner in which the urine would be
collected, the handling of the sample by a competent laboratory, and repercussions of positive testing results.73 The court described how this process limited
the invasion on privacy rights: "The notice provided by the consent forms
significantly diminishes the subjective intrusiveness of the urine testing
proposed."'74 What is important to note is that those tested under this program
had a real choice: With the knowledge they possessed, they could decide either
to take the test and participate in athletics or, forego the test and face no
consequences except for exclusion from school sports teams. This can be
contrasted with Anable where certain students were "led to believe that they had
to submit to the test on pain of dismissal from the school."75 While the studentathletes being tested in Schaill were only teenagers, the court did not seem to
view young age as a hindrance to a student's ability in weighing these
considerations. It did concede that "there is certainly a burden on these plaintiffs'
right to refuse drug testing," but then stated that "that burden is a light one
compared with... cases where drug testing is a condition of employment,
76
promotion or similar job related interest."
Hence, it becomes evident from the carefully drawn program in Schaill as
compared and contrasted with other testing policies, how relevant the nature of
the "invasion" on even diminished privacy rights of student-athletes truly is in
satisfying the Fourth Amendment. The balancing test is not one to be heavily
watered-down, as is evident from the fact that with student-athlete drug testing
programs, school officials must follow adequate safeguards, they may not impose
excessive penalties on those with positive results, and consent and notice must
play important roles.
IV. CONCLUSION

In summary, although there have been relatively few drug testing cases
concerning public high schools litigated before the courts, and even fewer such
cases centering on student-athletes, it becomes clear from examining the
opinions, that courts have encouraged the "singling out" of students on school

in this case, and hence an inability to participate in them might seem a rather harsh penalty, note the
ease with which a student-athlete could forestall such a result.
72. Anable, supra note 67, at 40.
73. Schaill, supra note 12, at 1321.
74. Id. at 1320.
75. Anable, supra note 67, at 39.
76. Schaill, supra note 12, at 1320. Hence, the court did not seem concerned with the notion that
students may feel peer pressure to take part in school athletics. It labeled participation in interscholastic athletics as a "benefit."
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sports teams for testing. Drug testing targeted at student-athletes tends to be
more consistent with the Fourth Amendment, because students on athletic teams
have diminished expectations of privacy and public school officials have more
persuasive reasons to justify the search of this group, as opposed to the rest of
the student body. However, the term "invasion" in the balancing test also
requires that other substantive and procedural considerations that must be
analyzed before a student-athlete drug testing program can be deemed
constitutional.
Elizabeth Walker
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